The reason behind the judge’s sudden withdrawal from the Kaneshiro-Mitsunaga bribery case

Forget the conspiracy theories. There’s a clear legal reason behind Judge Michael Seabright’s sudden and unexpected recusal from further involvement in the bribery and conspiracy case involving former Honoulu prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro.

Unfortunately, as late as this morning, the Honolulu Star-Advertiser reported that it’s unclear whether this will further delay the trial in the case, which is scheduled to begin in late February. Then the article notes: “It’s also unclear what prompted Seabright’s recusal.”

It’s true that Seabright gave no reason.

His January 24th order consists of a single brief sentence: “This court hereby recuses itself on its own motion from any and all proceedings in the above-captioned matter.”

But the reason is hiding in plain sight.

For those not familiar with this case, one in a series of federal prosecutions targeting political corruption in the state, the defendants–former Honolulu prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro; four executives of Mitsunaga & Associates, an architectural and engineering firm, including the company’s owner; and the company’s attorney–are charged with “conspiracy against rights” for engaging in a series of actions intended to “injure, oppress, threaten,
and intimidate” a former employee. The defendants are also charged with conspiracy to commit honest services fraud and federal program bribery, the Mitsunaga defendants for using bribes “disguised” as campaign contributions to pressure Kaneshiro into bring criminal charges against the former employee as a continuation of the company’s vendetta, and Kaneshiro for accepting the contributions in exchange for approving the filing of criminal charges.

The recusal decision goes back just a couple of days to a flurry of court filings on January 22, the deadline for “motions in limine” to be filed in the Kaneshiro-Mitsunaga case. Attorneys for the defendants filed 16 motions, while prosecutors added several of their own.

The Cornell Law School’s Legal Information Institute provides this explanation.

A “motion in limine” is a pretrial motion that seeks the exclusion of specific evidence or arguments from being presented during a trial. A motion in limine is decided by the judge outside of the presence of the jury. The purpose of a motion in limine is to address potentially prejudicial, irrelevant, or inadmissible information that could unduly influence a jury or hinder the fair administration of justice.

By filing a motion in limine, attorneys aim to prevent the opposing side from presenting evidence that could be highly emotional or legally problematic, thus avoiding any potential prejudice that could arise.

Seabright’s recusal, and the assignment of an out of state judge, appear to have been triggered by the defendant’s Motions in Limine #1-4, “To Exclude Reference to Prior Verdicts, Judicial and Administrative Orders and Findings Of Fact.”

Motion #4 “seeks to exclude at trial any reference to any order or factual finding by any United Stated District Judge related to any motion to compel grand jury testimony in this matter.”

MOTION IN LIMINE NO. 4
(Court Orders to Compel Grand Jury Testimony)

Defendants hereby move in limine to exclude at trial evidence, questioning and argument relating to any orders or factual findings by any United Stated District Judge related to any motion to compel grand jury testimony in this matter. (“Grand Jury Orders”). This includes Judge Leslie E. Kobayashi’s orders regarding defendant Terri Ann Otani (June 17, 2021) and non-defendant S.W. (July 14, 2021); Judge Derrick K. Watson’s orders regarding A.K. (June 10, 2021) and R.A. (July 29, 2021); and Judge J. Michael Seabright’s order regarding J.F. (June 23, 2021) (Collectively, “Grand Jury Orders”).

Further digging located a description of Seabright’s “order regarding J.F.” that is a target of the motion in limine. It is described in Seabright’s recent December 8, 2023 order denying a motion to dismiss the criminal charges.

In that order, J.F. is identified as Joann Fujii, the wife of Mitsunaga & Associates chief operating officer, Aaron Fujii, a defendant in the current criminal case.

…[O]n March 4, 2021, grand jury witness Joann Fujii (Defendant Aaron Fujii’s spouse), appeared before the grand jury and immediately invoked the Fifth Amendment, reading and repeating a statement explaining that she had a medical condition and complaining that the prosecution acted in an unsympathetic and intimidating manner and refused to tell her what the subpoena was about. She invoked the privilege to just about every question asked, refusing to answer questions such as “Are you in need of medical attention?” and “Do you need to take a break?” This court (Judge J. Michael Seabright) granted a government motion to compel testimony of Fujii at a hearing on June 23, 2021. In its ruling, this court told Tanaka (as Joann Fujii’s counsel), among other matters, that “[a] proper application requires that the Fifth Amendment be raised in response to specific questions,” and that a witness “must have a reasonable cause to apprehend such a danger [of self- incrimination] to the question posed.” The court reasoned, in part, that her “invocation [of the privilege] . . . in response to certain questions is simply absurd and abusive. . . . it seems relatively clear that she was invoking the privilege across the board [and] . . . was the equivalent of a blanket invocation.” In sum, the court ordered that Joann Fujii:

must appear before the grand jury and is ordered to answer questions, and may not invoke a blanket or the equivalent of a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege. If she has reasonable cause to believe that an answer to a specific question would either support a criminal conviction or provide a link in the chain of that, then the privilege may be asserted. And then if the U.S. disagrees, we can get back together. [citations omitted]

The government filed it’s own motion arguing that these rulings highlight efforts to frustrate the grand jury that were, in essence, a part of the continuing conspiracy by the Mitsunaga defendants, and should therefore be admitted at trial.

The rival motion in limine regarding Seabright’s earlier order, as well as similar decisions by Judge Leslie Kobayashi and Judge Derrick Watson ordering other witnesses to testify, put all of the Hawaii judges in a difficult position, but particularly Seabright, as he would have to rule on whether to allow evidence at trial about the efforts to avoid grand jury testimony.

Federal judges are required to recuse themselves in cases where they have a financial interest in the outcome of a case, or “where there is otherwise a strong possibility that the judge’s decision will be biased.” In the latter case, even the appearance of possible bias is to be avoided to avoid diminishing public trust in the judicial system.

So Judge Seabright did what the circumstances required. And the 9th Circuit did the same by assigning a senior judge from another district to take over the case.

Recusal explained.


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9 thoughts on “The reason behind the judge’s sudden withdrawal from the Kaneshiro-Mitsunaga bribery case

  1. JKS

    Why would Seabright nor recuse himself on the single question of ‘Motion #4’ and allow another judge to rule on it?

    Reply
    1. Ian Lind Post author

      I think it’s because if he returned to the case, his subsequent actions could potentially be challenged on appeal as being unduly influenced by his reaction to the defendant’s challenge. Having a judge from out of the district hear the case makes it much cleaner and eliminates certain potential appeals.

      Reply
      1. JKS

        If so, then this type of challenge becomes an easy way to remove a judge. For instance–If Kaneshiro thought Seabright was biased against him.

        Reply
  2. Walker

    I think everybody who follows this case so far should be able to take a ‘Miske Case’ test and receive college credit! I have not read so much since school !

    Reply
  3. Jim Bickerton

    28 USC 455 section 455 governs recusal and includes subsection (b)(3), which provides for mandatory recusal:

    (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy;

    This differs slightly from the state court rule, Hawaii Judicial Canon 2.11(a)(6)(B), which states
    (B) served in governmental employment and in such capacity, participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;

    Reply

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