I just finished reading Bob Woodward’s book, “Obama’s Wars“, which reports on the administration’s internal decision-making on Afghanistan policy. I think I said this before–it’s an eye-opening account of the infighting between military and civilian advisers, and between factions on each side of that civil-military boundary.

The book details the continuing difficulty the military has had in conceptualizing a war strategy that actually ties to achievable political goals and objectives. Time and again, in Woodward’s telling, top military brass refused to consider policy options and repeatedly undermined the search for realistic policy objectives through leaks and unauthorized comments, sometimes in violation of direct orders. A very troubling account, to be sure.

The general outline of President Obama’s approach: After two policy reviews, he essentially gave the military most of what it said it needed to get the job done, but made clear the commitment of resources had to show results within a year. A review of the military-political situation in Afghanistan is due to take place before the end of the year, and the outcome of that review will guide decisions about whether the military strategy is working or has any realistic chance of working. And “working” here refers to getting us closer to actual policy goals in a way that does not lock the U.S. into a war without end, something that is likely politically unsellable to the majority of the country.

Just after finishing the book, I saw the NY Times story on U.S. decision to send tanks into Afghanistan, and was struck by several things. First, there are the anonymous military sources, cited as “senior U.S. military officials”, “a senior officer in Afghanistan”, etc. Woodward documented how similar anonymous military sources successfully sandbagged President Obama as he sought to consider options in Afghanistan. Is this the same thing playing out? It’s hard to tell, but the timing is suspect.

Then there’s the issue of the political impact of this military escalation, and it clearly is an escalation. Although downplayed in this article, the increased firepower appears to undercut the attempt to “win heart and minds” that is at the center of the counter insurgency policy that had been front and center. Destroying homes, increased bombing, and now adding tanks to the mix, this is no longer a policy calculated to win friends in remote areas.

Then I noticed a writeup of a speech by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There’s a reference down in the story about the strategy in Afghanistan that echoed the internal battle described by Woodward.

President Barack Obama devoted an extraordinary amount of effort during the Afghanistan strategy review last fall to understand the fight and the direction he wanted that fight to take, Mullen said.

“Together, his national security team took a more narrow focus, identifying very clear goals to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either country in the future,” the chairman said, noting the strategy also shifted the military’s emphasis to training and increasing the size of Afghan security forces so they can eventually take the lead in securing their country.

As described in Obama’s Wars, the initial goal set out by the military was to defeat the insurgency, made up of the Taliban and al-Qaida, but that was deemed totally unrealistic given the resources and time frame available. The word “defeat” was then replaced by “disrupt and degrade”, meaning that the goal was seen as reducing the Afghan insurgency to a level that would not be capable of toppling a central government. In this approach, the “defeat” of the insurgency was not to be the indicator of success.

The “defeat” word has again appeared in this latest DOD statement, and there’s no indication of whether this is with the administration’s support or an attempt by the military to counter the administration’s position in advance of the policy review. At the same time, the Taliban has disappeared from the equation, replaced by al-Qaida. According to Woodward, all parties agreed there were very few–perhaps as few as several dozen–al-Qaida (as opposed to Taliban) operating in Afghanistan, the focus on al-Qaida could signal the military’s willingness to declare victory in Afghanistan.

All very confusing, and not at all encouraging for those who want to see a shift to making peace instead of making war.