10 thoughts on “Difficulties getting informed on Syria policy”

1. maunawilimac September 2, 2013 at 1:24 pm

   There is the Pax Christi International statement with comments from others accessible at Pax Christi USA’s website. The range of views accompanying it are interesting.

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2. Andy Parx September 2, 2013 at 2:30 pm

   I want my Al Jazeera.

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3. Patty September 2, 2013 at 2:30 pm

   Thank you,Ian, for your inquiring mind and humane heart in pursuing the truth about Syria. It appears that Obama and his administration have lost their mind!

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4. t September 2, 2013 at 4:53 pm

   http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/your-labor-day-syria-reader-part-2-william-polk/279255/

   This highly rated Atlantic piece can shatter any weak, prejudicial opinions. It is filled with actual research!
   All you need to do is read it.

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   1. jayz43 September 2, 2013 at 9:45 pm

      I read it. A VERY informative and interesting read. Mahalo.

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   2. Patty September 3, 2013 at 9:00 am

      Excellent! I appreciated William Polk’s insights on the Syria issue.

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   3. Keith Rollman September 3, 2013 at 11:15 am

      Worth the read.

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   4. Bill September 3, 2013 at 5:58 pm

      Thanks for the link … I am working on digesting this.

      I believe the only hope we have for the future of our country is to get rid of any belief that a particular political party will to save us.

      Folks don’t need to disavow their party. They just need to accept that loyalty to party over facts is destructive. We, as a country, are wallowing in massive intellectual dysfunction. May the Lord save us.

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5. Keith Rollman September 3, 2013 at 10:05 am

   Who care about Syria?…The Internet Cat Video Festival is coming up:

   http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/20130829_Internet_cat_video_festival_coming_to_Honolulu.html

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6. compare and decide September 5, 2013 at 10:20 pm

   From New Yorker magazine’s May 13, 2013 edition, here is Dexter Filkin’s article “The Thin Red Line: Inside the White House Debate on Syria”.

   http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/05/13/130513fa_fact_filkins

   The article begins by stating that the Syrian regime has been using chemical weapons for quite some time (since at least March), gradually escalating to test world opinion. But the article focuses on the response of the Obama administration. (Remember, this article was published in April.)

   Senior Israeli officials and Republicans in Washington, as well as British and French intelligence officials, have argued forcefully that the regime used chemical weapons. The Administration’s response has been characterized by caution, indecision, and reluctance to speak publicly about the subject. Officials said in late April that they believed chemical weapons had been used at least twice, but that they could not definitely tie the attacks to Assad. The White House said that it was not entirely clear who was in control of the weapons, leaving open the possibility that the attacks were accidental or unauthorized. “Given the stakes involved, and what we have learned from our recent experience, intelligence assessments alone are not sufficient,” the White House wrote in a letter to congressional leaders. Instead, the Administration would rely on the United Nations, which planned to send in experts to test soil and take samples from victims. Assad refused to allow the experts into the country.

   The Administration’s approach is influenced by public opinion.

   In Syria, more than seventy thousand people have died, and three and a half million have been forced from their homes; the refugee camp across the border in Jordan is now that country’s fifth-largest city. The Administration has given the Syrian opposition more than six hundred and fifty million dollars in nonmilitary aid, but Obama has consistently opposed arming the rebels or intervening militarily on their behalf. The United States has taken a tenuous position: not deep enough to please the rebels or its allies in Europe, or to topple the regime, or to claim leadership in the war’s aftermath—but also, perhaps most important, not so deep that it can’t get out. “Here’s what we wrestle with: there are huge costs and unintended consequences that go with a military intervention that could last for many years,” Benjamin Rhodes, Obama’s deputy national-security adviser, told me. After the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is little appetite for a new conflict. In a recent poll by the Times and CBS News, only a quarter of respondents felt that the U.S. should take responsibility for Syria. “The country is exhausted,” a senior White House official said.

   After the United States intervened in Bosnia in the 1990s, seemingly divergent lessons were learned, one supporting US foreign intervention, the other against.

   The intervention seemed to offer two lessons. The first was that the United States had become the indispensable nation, at least when it came to stopping a humanitarian disaster of the kind that occurred in Bosnia. “Only the United States can do this kind of enormous operation,” James P. Rubin, a Clinton-era official at the State Department who was involved in deliberations about the Balkans, said. “It’s not that we do it ourselves. It’s that we gather the world together to do it, parcel out the roles, make sure everybody takes certain responsibilities—the Germans do police, the French do reconstruction. If the United States doesn’t do it, then it doesn’t get done.”

   The second lesson was that, in terms of domestic politics, there wasn’t much to be gained from intervening in foreign countries, and there was plenty to lose if an intervention went awry. For Gary Bass, a Princeton professor who has written about humanitarian intervention, the remarkable thing about Clinton’s taking action in Bosnia was that he did it at all. Bass’s general rule is that every time a President sends troops to save lives overseas he risks political disaster; if he stays out, even in the face of calamity, there is little downside. Clinton’s reputation suffered when an American helicopter was shot down in Somalia, and eighteen soldiers were killed, but it was undiminished when he stood by during the Rwandan genocide, in which eight hundred thousand people died. In Bosnia, he got little credit for the lives he saved. “The political price is always heavily slanted against intervention when there is no core national-security interest involved,’’ Bass said.

   The article goes on to point out how Clinton, Bush and now Obama each came into office determined to avoid foreign entanglements, but were ultimately dragged into unpopular wars (for Obama, first Libya and now Syria). Interestingly, all of Obama’s advisors and staff have recommended military action in Syria, yet Obama has resisted.

   At times, Obama’s caution has isolated him within his Administration. In February, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Martin Dempsey, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. McCain said, “I would ask again, both of you, what I asked you last March, when seventy-five hundred citizens of Syria had been killed. It’s now up to sixty thousand. How many more have to die before you recommend military action?”

   “We did,’’ Panetta said. McCain turned to Dempsey, who also said, “We did.” They were referring to a covert proposal to supply weapons to the rebels, which was also supported by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, and the C.I.A. chief, David Petraeus. The proposal had been presented to Obama, and he overruled it. McCain told me that he was astonished: “There may be another time in history when a President’s entire national-security team recommended a course of action and he overruled them, but if there is I’m not aware of it.”

   Obama’s idealistic rhetoric belies his conservative realism.

   Part of what seems to rankle Obama’s critics is the sense that he is reducing the country’s commitments to suit what he regards as its reduced stature. “I think he believes that America’s touch sullies other lands, and particularly lands in the Third World,” Fouad Ajami, a Middle East scholar who has written bitterly about Obama’s reticence in Syria, told me. “There is a mistaken impression of Obama among many people that he is an idealist; they miss the realism at the core of his foreign policy.’’ He added, “Bush believed that freedom is a human calling. Obama doesn’t believe that.”

   The situation in Iraq is the kind of classic no-win situation that exposes the character of leaders. This can be likened to the ‘Kobayashi-Maru scenario’ from the Star Trek franchise movie, “The Wrath of Khan”. From the wiki:

   The Kobayashi Maru is a test in the fictional Star Trek universe. It is a Starfleet training exercise designed to test the character of cadets in the command track at Starfleet Academy. The Kobayashi Maru test was first depicted in the opening scene of the film Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan and also appears in the 2009 film Star Trek. In Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country, Dr. McCoy referenced the test as an example of the no-win scenario that he and Captain Kirk were facing.[1] The test’s name is occasionally used among Star Trek fans or those familiar with the series to describe a no-win scenario, or a solution that involves redefining the problem.

   Rescuing the civilian vessel Kobayashi Maru is the notional primary goal in a simulated battle with the Klingons. The disabled ship is located in the Klingon Neutral Zone, and any Starfleet ship entering the zone would be in violation of the Organian Peace Treaty. The approaching cadet crew must decide whether to attempt rescue of the Kobayashi Maru crew – endangering their own ship and lives – or leave the Kobayashi Maru to certain destruction.

   If the cadet chooses to save the Kobayashi Maru, the scenario progresses quickly. The bridge officers notify the cadet that they are in violation of the treaty. As the starship enters the Neutral Zone, the communications officer loses contact with the crippled vessel. Klingon starships then appear on an intercept course. Attempts to contact them are met with radio silence; indeed, their only response is to open fire with devastating results. There is no way to win the resulting battle, especially since the computer is allowed to “cheat” to guarantee defeat; the simulation ends with the understanding that the cadet’s ship has been lost with all hands. The objective of the test is not for the cadet to outfight the opponent but rather to test the cadet’s reaction to a no-win situation.

   Kirk explains that the test is meant to reveal how the subject deals with a no-win scenario, as how one deals with death is as important as how one deals with life. Later in the film, after repeated inquiries from Saavik, Kirk says that the exercise is a true “no-win scenario,” because there is no correct resolution–it is a test of character.

   James T. Kirk’s back-story defines that he took the test three times while at Starfleet Academy. Before his third attempt, Kirk surreptitiously reprogrammed the simulator so that it was possible to rescue the freighter. This fact finally comes out in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan, as Kirk, Saavik and others appear marooned, near death. Saavik’s response is, “Then you never faced that situation…faced death.” Kirk replies, “I don’t believe in the no-win scenario.” Despite having cheated, Kirk had been awarded a commendation for “original thinking.”

   As Spock had not entered Starfleet Academy as a command-track cadet, he did not take the Kobayashi Maru test while there. In his death scene at the conclusion of The Wrath of Khan, he described his sacrifice as his solution to the no-win scenario.

   Interestingly, in the 2008 election, John McCain was compared to Captain Kirk, and Barack Obama to Mr. Spock. Perhaps John Kerry could be compared to Dr. Leonard ‘Bones’ McCoy. Also, the neo-conservatives in the 2000s referred to themselves as ‘Vulcans’ – meaning that they were the rational realists making tough decisions. In retrospect, some like Ron Paul (conservative isolationist) have called the neo-conservatives “chickenhawks”. In that sense, the neo-cons are more like Klingon wannabes than they are like Vulcans: grandiose militarists who, in their own lives, avoided any kind of military service.

   So what about Hawaii’s Congressional delegation, past and future, in terms of foreign policy?

   Charles Djou seems like a mainstream conservative. Ed Case seems more like a neo-conservative (he said that he would have voted for the Iraq invasion, and he is fiscally conservative). Daniel Akaka and Dan Inouye seem like conservatives (voted against going into Iraq). Mazie Hirono, Tulsi Gabbard and Colleen Hanabusa likewise seem conservative (saying that they would vote against going into Iraq).

   But Brian Schatz is more obscure. He claimed that “Bush had false pretenses & inadequate planning for Iraq war. (Oct 2007)”

   http://www.ontheissues.org/states/HI_War_+_Peace.htm

   That sounds a lot like what John Kerry would say. And Kerry is a liberal with a congressional voting record 98% in agreement with Ted Kennedy. Brian Schatz is a liberal, I’d guess.

   And Hawaii is conservative.

   But isn’t Obama, Schatz’s fellow Punahou alumnus, a hero to Schatz?

   What happens when Schatz’s confronts Obama on Syria when Schatz figures out that Obama wants to avoid Syrian involvement?

   “Why you heartless, green-blooded Vulcan!”

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