Category Archives: Economics

I’m trying to process these contrasting realities

What’s wrong with this picture?

Here are two factoids drawn from yesterday’s evening news (Tuesday, June 9, 2020).

Hawaii News Now reported that Hawaii Foodbank distributed 2,500 boxes of food at Aloha Stadium.

The depth of the need is suggested by this sentence: “Vehicles tried to get in place before dawn over two hours before the official line up began and four hours before gates even opened. Packs of groceries ran out by noon.”

And in yesterday’s financial news, the stock of Apple Inc. and Amazon stock both closed at record highs.

What does that mean? Well, let’s say you decided to invest (gamble?) just over $3,000 in mid-1981, not long after Apple’s stock began trading on the over-the-counter stock market. You could have bought 100 shares of the company’s stock with your money. In inflation adjusted 2020 dollars, that would have been about $8,770.

But if you held on to those 100 shares, through the ups and downs of the stock market, and through a series of stock splits over the years, your Apple stock would now be worth $1,926,344. That’s right, nearly $2 million.

I had to double check those figures, and I’m pretty sure they’re right.

These seem to be describing two different worlds existing simultaneously.

And that’s the problem. They are.

Will hotels join malls on the growing list of deserted former landmarks?

A few years ago, I linked to the review of a photo book featuring dead and abandoned shopping malls, including one in Ohio that was once the largest mall in the country.

Changing tastes and demographics undercut the viability of many retail centers that had become common features of suburbia, and the photos convey the eerie reality that is normally out of public view.

Now I have to wonder whether the landscape is soon to be similarly littered with shuttered and abandoned hotels and motels whose owners or investors were unable or unwilling to wait out the current collapse of the travel market. With leisure travel virtually flatlining in less than two months, it is not at all clear how many properties with be able to resuscitate their businesses if and when the world starts traveling again.

And certainly some of those financially marginal property owners are likely to be asking for public assistance to stay afloat, citing their importance to their employees and the larger community. What’s the proper response going to be?

More dark financial clouds surround Honolulu’s rail project

In a blog post on Wednesday, Bob Jones highlighted another problem that Honolulu’s rail system is likely face, if it is ever actually completed. The problem? Live-in homeless.

Bob cites how homeless have been using train systems as moving hostels, taking over areas as they would take over sidewalk areas or bus stops. It’s not a pretty picture.

Couple it with the decision not to provide restroom facilities at rail stations, and it suggests this is all going to turn into an operation headache.

But for now, I’m concerned about the impact of COVID-19 on the economics of the rail system.

We’ve been living with a .5% general excise tax surcharge to fund construction of the rail system, and that extra half-percent has been extended through 2030. Remember, we were told, that visitors pay as much as 25% of the total raised through the GED.

But that was then. This is now. Visitors are paying virtually none of the GET. And the tax receipts raised through the GET have plummeted since most of Hawaii businesses have been shuttered.

Meanwhile, Honolulu has paid much of the rail’s tab to date by issuing general obligation bonds. The state, up until Covid-19 hit, has been considered a good credit risk. One of the primary considerations of the bond rating agencies has been the strength of Hawaii’s tourism industry.

For example, when the Moody’s rating service evaluated a rail bond issue earlier this year, it cited as Honolulu’s primary “credit strength” its “Credit strength” the “Strong economic conditions that include a healthy and growing tourism industry, extremely low unemployment levels, and an expanding tax base.”

Honolulu’s economy and tax base are key credit strengths. Tourism, a primary economic driver, continues to show strength: visitor counts to Honolulu in 2019 reached 6.2 million, up 5.6% from 2018. Since 2009, visitor counts to Honolulu have increased 53.9%. Visitors to Honolulu, which is coterminous with the island of Oahu, are a mix of both US domestic as well as international travelers, which helps moderate the effects of economic swings in any particular market. While we expect some impact from the coronavirus currently impacting China and East Asia, we expect the effect to be minimal if the outbreak is contained quickly. Visitors from China and Hong Kong represented 1.3% of visitors in 2018, and visitors from other Asian countries, primarily Japan, represented 17.8%. Other metrics of a strong tourism economy, including hotel room occupancy and revenue per available room have had similarly strong trends.

Many of the factors cited among Honolulu’s strengths have suddenly and dramatically changed. The shutdown of tourism along with the rest of non-essential businesses, the almost total halt to air travel, and soaring unemployment, have certainly altered the municipal finance landscape. That’s going to make future bond financing more costly for the city, even as its other sources of rail revenue have been hit.

Without any likely path to a full reopening of the tourism industry anytime soon, and high unemployment likely to be with us for a while, the cash flow dedicated to the rail is certainly going to face significant new shortfalls in the short-to-intermediate term.

Where is the city going to turn to find the money to make up the difference and keep rail construction on track?

The board of the Honolulu Authority for Rapid Transportation (HART) is now under increased pressure to show the public that it has a viable financial plan and budget that takes into account the dramatically changed financial world.

And a postscript: After an exchange with Jones a couple of days ago in which we disagreed over how to assess the social media site Change.org, he sent the following email.

Thanks for the vote of confidence in my blog.

We disagree on the Change.org template (Word Press doesn’t put Word Press and its logo at the head of my blog, so displays no endorsement of my postings) but you are very civil about the disagreement and I in turn fully appreciate your take on the issue. If we all handled disagrements with such civil exchanges it would be a much better American experience.

Agreed. I already consider the Bob Jones Report to be essential reading. Hopefully a growing number of others will also.

CMBS could pose risks for some Hawaii’s hotels & retail properties

CMBS. Not exactly a familiar acronym to most of us. It stands for collateralized mortgage-backed securities, which refers to the repackaging of the underlying mortgages beneath hotels, shopping malls, and other large properties to create securities which are then sold to investors, offering a way to finance debt beyond the relative safety of plain vanilla mortgage loans.

Hawaii hotels are sitting on billions of dollars of CMBS which are subject to debt service payments and eventual repayment of the principal amounts. But the current lockdown of Hawaii’s tourism industry could leave many facing difficulties making required payments.

Back in early March, prognosticators were suggesting Hawaii’s visitor industry could see revenue declines of 15-35% this year due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Under those scenarios, Hawaii’s tourism-based industry was rated likely to weather the financial storm, with perhaps a couple of shaky properties.

But a virtually total shutdown of the entire industry for an extended period of time, with no clear path to full reopening, doesn’t just mean a high level of unemployment among hotel, restaurant, and retail employees.

The danger, of course, is if hotels may be unable to cover their debt service payments and default, especially if Hawaii’s lockdown is prolonged. With revenues down to zero at this time for most Hawaii hotels and resorts, it’s hard to imagine that there isn’t a lot of fear and trembling behind the scenes.

Pacific Business News called attention to the problem in a March 31, 2020 story.

In a March 27 letter addressed to a host of federal regulators, the heads of the American Hotel and Lodging Association and Asian American Hotel Owners Association said the industry’s “unprecedented cash flow crisis” brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic requires a separate financial lifeline as well as special protections from the sector’s legions of lenders and loan servicers….

“Many hotels are unable to pay operating costs and thus debt service,” wrote AHLA President Chip Rogers and AAHOA President Cecil Staton in their letter to the U.S. Treasury, Federal Reserve and Securities and Exchange Commission. “This will cause a snowball effect of foreclosures followed by lenders taking ownership of severely distressed assets with no ability to operate them.”

“Hotels in the Urban Honolulu area owe more than $2.2 billion in outstanding debt, and those in the Kahului-Wailuku-Lahaina MSA has nearly $750 million in outstanding CMBS debt,” PBN reported, pointing to 17 properties in Honolulu and another 7 on Maui with outstanding CMBS debt exposure.

A March 2, 2020 report by the Kroll bond rating agency also assessed the situation in Hawaii.

“Hawaii is home to 18 lodging properties—$4.33 billioin by allocated loan amount (ALA)—that serve as collateral for 17 loans securitized in 25 CMBS transactions. Additionally, there are 28 retail properties, inclusive of mixed-use assets with a significant retail component, collateralizing 28 loans ($2.95 billion) in 30 securitizations.”

Kroll then examined scenarios what would happen under “stress” where hotels were hit with drops of 15%, 25%, and in the worst case considered, 35% declines in business.

The report found only two properties, the Four Seasons Resort Hualalai and Waikiki Beach Marriott Resort & Spa, would not have the cash flow to cover debt obligations under at least the worst case scenario (a 35% decline). But if the same review were done today, it’s unclear whether its conclusions would be so sanguine.

Back in 2017, data published at Trepp.com, which maintains what it says is the largest commercially available database of securitized mortgages, listed two Hawaii resorts as among the five highest valued properties backed by securitized debt transactions.

The Hilton Hawaiian Village was ranked #2 by Trepp with a value of $2.23 billion.

Overall, the borrower’s fees and leasehold interest in Hilton Hawaiian Village anchors $1.275 billion in CMBS debt that is securitized in the single-asset HILT 2016-HHV deal, along with eight other conduit transactions. The fixed-rate mortgage is split into 16 pari-passu A-notes totaling $696.6 million and five B-notes with a combined balance of $578.4 million that were used for the refinancing of an existing $1.255 billion debt package.

And the Four Seasons Resort Maui at Wailea followed at #5 on Trepp’s list. The resort, with an “as-is” appraised value of $910 million (in 2017), “secures $600 million in debt that consists of a $469 million CMBS loan and two mezzanine notes totaling $131 million,” Trepp reported.

With high occupancy rates, these mega-resorts were projected to have little trouble covering their debt payments. However, with zero occupancy for an extended period, many others could be facing cash flow problems.

I’m less than comfortable making sense of the risks ahead as a result this kind of high financial stress. As they say, however, there be dragons.