I crawled out of bed, fed the hungry but overweight cats, then sat down at the computer to check the morning headlines. This is what I’m seeing at the Star-Bulletin, scrambled headlines on individual stories.
![[text]](/images_2009/headlines0304.jpg)
I was ready to blame their web site, but then I tried a different browser, just in case. Sure enough, headlines are being mangled in Safari but render properly in Firefox. I really don’t have a clue why this would be happening.
And then there’s this from KITV’s web site:
![[text]](/images_2009/traffic0304.jpg)
The reader who called this to my attention quipped:
“But can they spell it accurately?”
Advertiser reporter Rick Daysog’s challenge after being excluded from a court-ordered public auction of Aloha Airlines name resulted in the auction being declared invalid in Bankruptcy Court yesterday. There’s no question that it was Daysog’s letter to the court that triggered the action, as it was cited in the judge’s earlier Order to Show Cause.
But at least some other media failed to give Daysog credit for raising questions after being excluded from the bankruptcy auction.
KHON, for example, reported simply:
A previous sale procedure on the intellectual property was supposed to be held in an open and public manner but media and other interested parties were kept out of the room.
True, but not specific enough to be the real story.
PBN was even more generic in its treatment of the story.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Lloyd King invalidated the sale of Aloha’s brand and logo to Aloha’s former majority owner, Yucaipa Companies, because, King said, the sale was not held publicly.
KGMB’s story by Jim Mendoza got it right, though, as did the Star-Bulletin’s report by Dave Segal.
I guess sometimes it’s just hard to credit the competition.
Thanks to Senator Les Ihara for pointing out something important about the pending appeal regarding corporate campaign contributions which I failed to focus on.
In the appeal, the Campaign Spending Commission raises two questions.
First: Whether the Circuit Court erred when it ruled that HRS Section 11-204b does not apply to corporations and companies making contributions directly from their treasuries to candidates.
Second: Whether the Circuit Court erred when it held that a corporation or company making contributions directly from its treasury to a candidate is not a “noncandidate committee” as that term is defined.
Ihara correctly states that the legislative history is likely to show that the lower court decision incorrectly concluded that a corporation making direct contributions aren’t considered “noncandidate committees”. This simple point is important, because it triggers the reporting and disclosure requirements of the law, which all parties seem to agree is one vital aspect of our campaign law.
But I don’t think it follows that the act of making a direct contribution is enough to trigger that $1,000 limit. As plaintiffs and the Attorney General argued quite persuasively, the commission’s attribution of a fictional step involving what they admit is an accounting artifice was necessary to its interpretation of the law.
One premise of reading ambiguous laws is that you are directed to find an interpretation that takes into account and gives force to all parts of the statute.
In this case, it makes perfect sense to simply conclude that the commission was wrong to say that writing a check to a third party (in this case a candidate) necessarily involves a hypothetical transfer to a noncandidate committee, while at the same time concluding that for reporting and disclosure purposes, the corporation is a noncandidate committee and must disclose. And it becomes a noncandidate committee, according to the definition, by simply making a contribution or expenditure.
In my view, that’s simple, straightforward, and doesn’t require lots of contortions.
In an email, Ihara writes:
This is what I believe is the crux of the problem: legislative intent that corporations report donations through their PAC, and a contrary non-intention (inadvertent error) that explicitly limited aggregate donations to $1,000 per election. What is the higher court to do, and decide? I don’t know. I believe it is fair to say that the law may be ambiguous on this point, and what the law really is is up to the appeals court to decide. I think it would be incorrect and presumptuous to say that the law is one way or the other, until the higher court ruling.
I believe the legislature is attempting to resolve this issue through HB 539, and now possibly HB 215. It appears the legislature wants the resolution to include increasing the $1,000 to a higher amount. Good government groups seem to want to retain the $1,000 aggregate limit or reduce that amount to zero. While I have my own position on the issue, I am not certain how this will turn out. We’ll see.
Well said. Thanks.
![[text]](/images_2009/saigons030309.jpg)
Meda caught this scene at Saigon’s Restaurant in Kaimuki yesterday. The huge batch of summer rolls was apparently destined for a wedding party.
Discover more from i L i n d
Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.
“Summer rolls”? The Japanese term I am aware of is “harumaki”, which is literally “Spring rolls”. Something different that what I am thinking of?
and figuratively “egg roll”
Here’s Sen. Ihara’s full comment, sent via email:
It appears you believe the current situation of corporate campaign donations in Hawaii is that the law allows corporations to contribute more (you don’t say how much; unlimited?) than an aggregate of $1,000 per election. However, that is the question to be decided by the appeals court, and you seem to be making the plaintiff’s arguments.
The other side is that “previous to the Tavares ruling, corporations and companies that used treasury funds for contributions made their contributions through a noncandidate committee (a paper registration and reporting mechanism to provide transparency), so the public could determine which candidates corporations and companies were contributing to and how much they were contributing.” This quote is from a Campaign Spending Commission website advisory at: http://hawaii.gov/campaign/tavares.htm
I believe CSC has consistently interpreted HRS 11-194 as requiring corporations that raise or spend more than $1,000 in corporate funds must either register as a noncandidate committee or establish its own noncandidate committee (see CSC adv. op. no. 98-02, and other opinions, issued pursuant to HRS 193(a)(16). See also HRS 11-191 definitions of “committee and “noncandidate committee”, the latter which is “a ‘committee’…that has the purpose of making contributions or expenditures to influence the nomination for election, the election of any candidate to political office, or for or against any issue on the ballot….”
The relevant part of HRS 11-191 defines “committee” to mean: “(1) any organization, association, or individual that accepts or makes a contribution or makes an expenditure for or against any: (A) candidate; (B) individual who files for nomination at a later date and becomes a candidate; or (C) party”. This means a corporation is a committee when it makes a campaign donation to a candidate. Also, a “noncandidate committee” means a committee [eg corporation]…that has the purpose of making contribution…to influence the nomination for election, the election of any candidate to political office, or for or against any issue on the ballot….”
But that is the question the appeals court will decide — whether campaign statutes define corporations as noncandidate committees. Of course, legislative intent is important, and I haven’t done the research yet — but I believe the legislature fully intended to require corporations to report their donations through noncandidate committee reports. On the other hand, I am also clear that the legislature did not intend to limit corporations to an aggregate campaign contribution limit of $1,000.
This is what I believe is the crux of the problem: legislative intent that corporations report donations through their PAC, and a contrary non-intention (inadvertent error) that explicitly limited aggregate donations to $1,000 per election. What is the higher court to do, and decide? I don’t know. I believe it is fair to say that the law may be ambiguous on this point, and what the law really is is up to the appeals court to decide. I think it would be incorrect and presumptuous to say that the law is one way or the other, until the higher court ruling.
I believe the legislature is attempting to resolve this issue through HB 539, and now possibly HB 215. It appears the legislature wants the resolution to include increasing the $1,000 to a higher amount. Good government groups seem to want to retain the $1,000 aggregate limit or reduce that amount to zero. While I have my own position on the issue, I am not certain how this will turn out. We’ll see.
LES IHARA, JR.
In your main post, you seemed to assert that corporations are distinct and separate entities from PACs, which are required to maintain a separate checking account to receive and expend funds. I will check, but it may be legal for the corporation to maintain a sub-account in a corporate account.
Based on HRS 11-191 definitions, I believe corporations are themselves a “noncandidate committee”, because they are by definition a “committee” and a special type of committee called “noncandidate committee” which “has the purpose of making contributions or expenditures to influence the nomination of an election, the election of any candidate to political office….” sec. 11-191
I believe the companies that intervened in the Tavares court case asserted their company did not have a purpose to influence elections, I think, because their articles of incorporation did not include that purpose. In any case, it’s difficult to believe a corporation that donates to a PAC would deny seeking to influence elections…since that’s the purpose of PACs.
To follow up on my last point above, Tavares plaintiff-intervener Quong Enterprises said they are not a noncandidate committee because their company was not organized for “the purpose of making contributions or expenditures to influence the nomination for election, the election of any candidate to political office, or for or against any issue on the ballot.”
Are they saying that their campaign donations were made for another purpose?